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Central Intelligence Agency




Washington, D.C. 20505

19 September 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
National Security Council

SUBJECT : EC/San Jose Meeting; Soviet/Cuban
Relations

Attached is the information on European Assistance
to Central America and Soviet/Cuban relations you re-
quested in your 14 September memorandum.



Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

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Response to NSC Query

QUESTION 1: The amounts and types of economic and military assistance to the governments of Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras from the EC countries and Spain and Portugal, by year, from 1979 to the present. We are not interested merely in aggregate figures, but, to the extent possible, we would like details of significant projects (those consummated as well as proposed) including terms of financing, direct or implicit subsidies, etc. An example of particular interest is the proposed Nicaraguan geothermal project. [REDACTED]

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ANSWER:

Spain

Spain has provided Nicaragua with consistent financial support, disbursing, by our estimates, some \$10-\$20 million in credits and grants every year since the revolution. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Assistance in subsequent years has mainly been in the form of supplier credits with repayment periods ranging from one to eight years. The last official commitment was in mid-1983, when Madrid announced a three-year, \$45 million line of credit. The credits probably will be used mostly for the purchase of Spanish industrial goods and carry a 10 percent interest rate and 5-7 year term, according to the US Embassy in Managua. We expect disbursements under this line to be a maximum of \$15 million each in 1984 and 1985. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Spain has occasionally given foodstuffs and other humanitarian aid since 1979, but it is of minimal financial significance. Madrid also rescheduled Managua's \$62 million bilateral debt in early 1981 on easy terms, granting a 7-year grace period, at 7.5 percent interest. \$2.3 million in overdue interest was forgiven, according to our Embassy in Managua. [REDACTED]

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France

French economic assistance to Nicaragua has risen substantially since the Mitterrand government was installed in [REDACTED]

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1981. Previously, France had been disbursing less than \$2 million per year, probably in humanitarian assistance. In late 1981, Paris agreed to a \$9 million credit, apparently intended for food storage and other reconstruction purposes. Of that, about half was a concessional loan, carrying a 3.5 percent interest rate, a 24-year term and a seven year grace period. The remainder was an export credit carrying a 10 percent rate according to the US Embassy in Paris. [REDACTED]

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A second major credit, granted in mid-1982, totaled \$15-20 million, of which \$7 million was balance-of-payments assistance. The remainder was a mix of concessional and commercial credits for a variety of industrial development projects. With the 1981 and 1982 lines available, the French disbursed about \$26 million to Nicaragua, according to their published statistics. [REDACTED]

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Italy

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
Other Italian assistance has generally remained at less than \$5 million per year, and we believe it is focused on food supplies and health care.

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The Netherlands

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The Dutch Foreign Ministry has told US officials, however, that it will probably phase out its aid almost completely after the current program expires next year, largely due to the Hague's dissatisfaction with Sandinista political and military policies.


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West Germany

West German credits to Nicaragua--the terms of which we do not know--averaged about \$19 million annually between 1979 and

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


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In mid-1982, Bonn had permitted Managua to reschedule its bilateral debt payments on easy terms. US Embassy reporting indicates that Managua received an 11-year grace period at 10 percent on its \$4 million commercial debt, and a 10-year grace period at 3.7 percent on its \$9.5 million government-to-government debt.

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Denmark

In 1979 and 1980 Denmark provided a total of about one million dollars in emergency aid to Nicaraguan refugees. In 1981, according to the US Embassy in Copenhagen, the Danes pledged \$1.8 million, of which \$500,000 was allotted to a hospital project, \$800,000 was channeled to a health worker training program administered by the Danish church, and another \$500,000 went to a forestry seeding project. In 1982, \$3.6 million was granted for water supply and health projects. We are unaware of any new commitments in 1983 or 1984. A senior Danish Foreign Ministry official recently told our Embassy that Denmark now has a policy of refusing additional aid, on the ostensible grounds that Nicaraguan per capita income is too high to qualify for assistance. The real reason, according to the official, is that Managua has broken its promises to Copenhagen to ease internal repression and broaden participation in the elections.

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Belgium

Belgian assistance to Nicaragua has varied between \$200,000-\$600,000 in the years 1980-1982, and we believe that it has declined since then. Belgian officials have told the US Embassy that this money was committed prior to the Sandinista takeover, and is directed at non-governmental programs, probably private voluntary organizations such as CARE. Officials in Brussels told our Embassy emphatically in mid-1982 that they did not intend to commit any future aid to the Sandinistas.

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Other Countries

Since 1979, Nicaragua has paid back more on earlier loans from the UK than it has received in new assistance. Thus, net financial flows have varied between minus \$500,000 and minus \$2 million for the past four years. We are aware of only two individual examples of aid:

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We are unaware of any official military or economic assistance to Nicaragua from Portugal, Ireland or Luxembourg since 1979. We do not expect any of these countries to commit themselves to any significant aid programs to Managua in the future. The EC as an institution has consistently provided assistance, which peaked at \$15 million in 1980. It has declined about \$3 million annually since then. We believe that it consists largely of food grants and credits for technical assistance. In 1984, we expect that the total will reach perhaps \$3 to \$4 million.

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West European Assistance to Other Central American Nations

Our information on West European assistance to other Central American nations is much more limited, in large part because the dollar amounts involved are small both to the donors and the recipients. The Central American countries hope to receive EC financial support for clearing intra-regional debts, and assistance in marketing their products in Europe. The EC will probably agree to some, but not all, of these objectives at the 28-29 September EC-Central America conference.

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Costa Rica

West Germany has been San Jose's largest European supporter in the past five years. Published German statistics indicate that Bonn's aid program netted \$4.6 million for Costa Rica in 1979, which ballooned to \$24 million in 1980 and \$20 million in 1981. Roughly half was channeled as loans for projects such as ports, electric power and rural development. As Costa Rica's acute financial crisis of the early 1980s eased, FRG assistance began to decline, falling to \$9 million in 1982 and an estimated \$5 million in 1983. We project that aid in 1984 and 1985 will be roughly constant at around \$7 million annually.

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French aid has been slightly lower, peaking in 1980 at \$17.5 million and declining to \$5 million by 1982, according to official French statistics. Very little of this has been development assistance; it seems more likely to have been grants

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of food or short-term balance-of-payments support. We estimate French aid in 1983 and 1984 at less than \$5 million annually. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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In 1980, Italy provided nearly \$4 million in net assistance, up from \$600,000 the previous year. During 1981-82, however, repayment of earlier credits left San Jose's balance between minus \$2 and minus \$5 million. Nevertheless, late in 1983 Rome opened a \$40 million line of credit, according to Costa Rican press. We have no information on terms for that loan. Earlier that year, Rome also donated \$1.6 million worth of rice,

25X1 [REDACTED] After President Monge's mid-1984 European tour, Italy decided to provide \$25 million for a series of development projects, according to the US Embassy. The funds will be split evenly between grants and concessional loans. [REDACTED]

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El Salvador

France and West Germany have been the main providers of economic assistance. France contributed an average of \$12 million per year between 1979 and 1981, and nothing in 1982. West Germany has provided no aid since 1979, but announced in May the resumption of economic assistance following Duarte's election. In August, the UK announced the resumption of its aid program--after a five-year break--with an immediate offer of \$640,000 to buy civilian supplies and equipment. The Italians will provide about \$3 million of aid for food and medicine in 1984. The EC countries provided no significant military aid between 1979 and 1982. [REDACTED]

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Guatemala

France and West Germany supplied averages of \$65 million and \$11 million in economic aid, respectively, between 1979 and

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1982. The French assistance was probably largely in the form of guaranteed financing for French exports. Economic aid from other EC countries, as well as military aid from all EC countries, was negligible. [REDACTED]

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Honduras

The EC provided an annual average of \$6 million in economic aid between 1979 and 1982. Individually, West Germany, UK, the Netherlands, and France provided averages of \$6.5, \$4.5, \$3.5 and \$3 million, respectively, during the same period. West Germany will provide \$17 million for infrastructure, training, and agricultural projects in 1984. Military aid from the EC countries was negligible. [REDACTED]

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QUESTION 2: The amounts of economic and military assistance (if any) from the EC-10, Spain, Portugal or from any organizations within these countries to the FDR/FMLN, FDN, ARDE, MISURA. [REDACTED]

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ANSWER:

Nicaragua

Anti-Sandinista insurgent groups--FDN, ARDE, Misura--do not appear to have obtained significant funds from either West European officials or private sources, despite several trips by insurgent leaders to Europe to obtain support. [REDACTED]

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El Salvador

Support from West European governments--particularly France, Spain, and the Netherlands--to the Salvadoran insurgents has been largely political, with little if any material aid being offered. Nevertheless, various Church, academic, human rights, and left-wing solidarity groups in the EC-10 countries are [redacted] have contributed unspecified sums of money to the guerrillas over the years.

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Since January 1984, [redacted] have reported a significant decline in West European contributions to the insurgent movement.

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[redacted] We believe that political and military setbacks suffered by the insurgents--most notably the popular election of a liberal civilian president and the guerrillas' inability to regain the tactical initiative since December 1983--also have dampened leftist enthusiasm in Western Europe for the revolutionary cause. [redacted]

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QUESTION 3: An exact chronology of events which describe the current state of Cuban/Soviet relations since October 1983 and an analysis of Cuban/Soviet relationship since October 1983. [redacted]

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ANSWER:

Soviet-Cuban Relations: A Review of Key Issues

Soviet-Cuban differences over the last year represent a trough in their longstanding pattern of fluctuating relations. In the past, for example, there have been serious differences over revolutionary strategy in Latin America that climaxed with Moscow using its oil leverage in 1967 and Cuba arresting a "microfaction" because of its dealings with Soviet Embassy officials. More recently, there have been less significant disagreements such as the friction over the Afghanistan intervention. Nonetheless, this pattern of ups and downs always remains within certain parameters, and since the 1970s, has never posed a serious threat to the overall relationship. In our

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opinion, disagreements over the past year are symptomatic of the patron-client relationship of the two countries wherein both Moscow and Havana seek to maximize their gains from their bilateral ties.

This patron-client relationship has not undergone fundamental changes during the past year. Indeed, the prevailing trend toward closer cooperation is likely to continue, as Cuba--suffering economic difficulties at home--remains dependent upon the \$4-5 billion in economic aid provided annually by Moscow. Castro realizes that he has no alternative source for the massive Soviet aid that keeps his economy afloat. Moreover, the Cuban military depends almost entirely on the Soviets for weapons, equipment, and training. Soviet arms deliveries during the first six months of 1984 exceed the amount provided by Moscow during the same period last year.

Despite the mutual benefits derived from the relationship, several issues have caused friction between the two countries and, as has happened in the past, have temporarily strained Soviet-Cuban rapport. Over the past year, issues ranging from the loss of Grenada and Soviet policy in the Third World to Cuba's economic development and its role in CEMA have generated differences between leaders in Moscow and Havana. Even the longstanding question of the Soviet commitment to Cuba has risen again in the wake of Grenada--at least in Havana's eyes.

Soviet Support for Cuba

Statements by Cuban leaders over the last several months, including those of Castro, indicate that Havana is increasingly preoccupied with the reelection of President Reagan and their perception that the US will intervene in Central America and perhaps even attack Cuba directly. Believing that a confrontation with the US may be forthcoming, Castro's sense of vulnerability was almost surely heightened by the Grenada crisis. The fact that Moscow has virtually ignored Cuba's two most important holidays this year--the January 1 anniversary of the revolution and the July 26 anniversary of the storming of the Moncada barracks--may increase Cuban anxieties even further concerning Soviet support and solidarity:

- Moscow did not send a delegation for the January 1 holiday; this is particularly noteworthy since this year was the 25th anniversary of the revolution. Minister of Culture Demichev visited from January 4-9 to help unveil a Lenin statue; Pravda noted that he met with Fidel

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Castro, while the Cuban media made no mention of such talks.

- A low-level Soviet delegation attended the July 26 event, but neither the Soviet nor Cuban media acknowledged its presence.

Traditionally, the Soviets use these occasions to highlight bilateral ties and to make statements of solidarity in support of the Cuban revolution. Moscow's failure to do so, at a time of major Cuban anxiety over US intentions, is not totally out of keeping with Moscow's current tack toward Central America/Caribbean as a whole. As evidenced by their policy in Nicaragua, the Soviets are playing down their involvement in the region, presumably to avoid inflaming US sensitivities. At the same time, however, they are delivering large amounts of military assistance to give Managua and Havana the means to defend themselves.

Soviet Third World Policies Disturb Castro

The Cubans appear increasingly frustrated with the Soviets preoccupation with the situation in Europe, especially INF, at a time when they believe they are seriously threatened and Soviet attention should be focused on Central America and the Third World. Moreover, Havana apparently is unhappy with the direction of Moscow's policy in the Third World, which some Cubans feel may portend a decline in support for Cuba.

- Cuban officials have complained [REDACTED] that Soviet preoccupation with the US and INF has weakened the socialist position in the Third World. Arguing for a more forceful Soviet role, they cited Mozambique as a situation where lack of Soviet support prompted a regime to look elsewhere, ie., by negotiating with South Africa at Nkomati. The Cubans also complained of Moscow's limited support of Grenada, which stood in contrast to the aid provided by Havana.

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Such concerns, together with growing US pressure, probably led Castro to begin talks with Washington on some bilateral issues, such as the refugee problem. Moscow's view of such moves is unclear; to date the Soviet media have not acknowledged the US-Cuban talks.

Grenada

While there has been some controversy within the intelligence community over the extent and nature of Soviet-Cuban differences over Grenada, it is clear Castro was frustrated by Moscow's weak response. Moscow, conversely, was unhappy with Castro's subsequent interpretation of the events there.

- The official Soviet line, as elaborated in TASS commentary, placed blame for the Grenada episode on the US, whose "special services" were alleged to have penetrated Grenadan circles and created a pretext for the US intervention.
- Castro, in his 14 November speech at the funeral of the Cubans killed in Grenada, placed the blame squarely upon Coard, arguing that his actions set in motion the events which gave the US a pretext to intervene. So far Cuba has not adopted the Soviet line that alleged US intelligence involvement in the Bishop-Coard dispute.
- The TASS replay of the Castro speech pointedly omitted those paragraphs in the speech which discussed Coard's culpability.

The Soviets, however, may be adopting a new line which comes closer to Castro's position:

- In a May 1984 article in New Times, Soviet academician Ambartsumyan--in discussing Lenin's pragmatism and the need to keep in touch with the masses--condemned Coard for prematurely speeding up the course of the Grenadan revolution, a move for which the masses were not prepared. In so doing, according to the Soviet author, Coard paved the way for the forces of counterrevolution.
- A subsequent article in an August issue of Literaturnaya Gazeta, however, has repeated Moscow's original claims of a US provocation bringing down the regime in Grenada.

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Economic Planning and Cuba's Role in CEMA

A number of indicators suggest that Havana is unhappy over Moscow's "development strategy" for Cuba, and the specific role assigned Cuba in the long-term CEMA master plan:

- An East European diplomat told the US interests Section in Havana that Cuba, during the pre-summit planning talks, sought to adjust its economic role to emphasize accelerated industrial development. The Cubans were evidently rebuffed, as the CEMA summit documents note that Cuba will continue instead to focus on agriculture. (This may explain Castro's absence from the summit; knowing his proposals had been rejected, he did not want to be identified directly with the summit resolutions).

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Differences on Cuba's economic plan and role within CEMA can be similarly inferred in a 26 June Pravda article by Cuban Politburo member Jorge Risquet:

- The introduction--provided by Pravda--focuses exclusively on CEMA and its impact on Cuban economic development. It describes the CEMA summit as a "very important event in the history of world socialism and the international communist and workers movement." 25X1

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- In contrast, Risquet's text fails to mention the CEMA summit even once--despite the fact that the article deals exclusively with Cuba's economic development, successes, tasks and problems.

Angola

Media articles [redacted] indicate that Havana may be preparing the way for a withdrawal from Angola, a development the Soviets would view as a setback in Africa.

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- Articles on the Cuban troop withdrawal issue in the Cuban press--heretofore quite rare--have prompted public speculation that the troops might come home soon.
- Cuban officials have told [redacted] that Havana is now resigned to a withdrawal.
- Castro clearly was angered by the Angolan and Mozambican negotiations with South Africa early this year and apparently believes Cuban interests, as well as those of Cuba's allies in the ANC and SWAPO, have been compromised. His cool treatment of President Dos Santos during the latter's visit to Cuba in March suggests he is wary of a continued open-ended military commitment in Angola.

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In our opinion, Castro would ultimately accede to Soviet wishes, but he would resist Soviet pressure to increase Cuban involvement in Angola if it raised the possibility of social unrest in Cuba. Tensions could also develop if Castro felt the USSR had sold out in Angola or had used the Cuban troop issue in the bigger game of US-Soviet relations.

The Olympics Boycott

Castro delayed more than two weeks before following Moscow's lead in boycotting the US Olympics. (It took him several months to offer a full-fledged endorsement of the Soviet move into Afghanistan). While some might argue this is a "staged act", the decision was almost certainly a painful one for Castro:

- Cuban success in olympic competition allows Castro to showcase the fruits of his "socialist system" and the new "socialist man;" "it also boosts morale at home."

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- Havana's failure to participate underscores its general isolation from the wider Latin community, as the other Latin states did participate--even the Nicaraguans.
- The Cuban boycott again made Cuba appear subservient to a Soviet master.

Outlook for Relations

From the Soviet perspective, Cuba remains the most important symbol of Moscow's commitment to "socialist" change in the Third World. The Soviets still derive important political, geostrategic, and military benefits from the relationship. Cuba provides strong support for Moscow's policies in third world forums where the USSR has limited access. Cuba also gives the Soviets access to facilities in the Western Hemisphere from which they can discreetly promote their objectives and funnel support to leftist groups operating outside of Moscow's sphere of influence. Cuba's proximity to the US, moreover, enables Moscow to conduct intelligence and reconnaissance activities against the US.

The recent frictions in Soviet-Cuban relations stem from different perspectives on some issues owing to the Soviets broader responsibilities as a global power, several diplomatic setbacks over the last year, and Castro's heightened sense of vulnerability and need for Soviet assurances of support. Despite these recent policy disagreements, however, Moscow has maintained the high level of military deliveries to Cuba that have characterized the past few years (For details on the deliveries and types of equipment involved, see the chronology section.) This is consistent with past Soviet behavior, even during times of bilateral friction. In 1967, for example, Soviet military deliveries to Cuba surged when the Moscow-Havana relationship was at its lowest point. We believe Moscow will continue to deliver more and better equipment, in part to assuage Castro and to improve Cuban defense capabilities, and that the tactical differences between Moscow and Havana will not weaken their strategic relationship.

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Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT:

EC/San Jose Meeting; Soviet/Cuban
Relations (S)The NSC would appreciate receiving the following information
by September 19, 1984:

1) The amounts and types of economic and military assistance to the governments of Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras from the EC countries and Spain and Portugal, by year, from 1979 to the present. We are not interested merely in aggregate figures, but, to the extent possible, we would like details of significant projects (those consummated as well as proposed) including terms of financing, direct or implicit subsidies, etc.

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3) An exact chronology of events which describe the current state of Cuban/Soviet relations since October 1983 and an analysis of Cuban/Soviet relationship since October 1983. (S)

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Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

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